I
n the celebrated final scene of Michelangelo Antonioni's L'eclisse (1962), a series of cuts reveal various objects fixed within and people moving through the space of and around a particular street corner in the EUR (Esposizione Universale di Roma) where two lovers, Vittoria (Monica Vitti) and Piero (Alain Delon), are expected to meet but are nowhere to be found. Lasting over seven minutes without any dialogue or explicit indication of its narrative function, absence becomes increasingly pronounced. It is this very lack that is foregrounded in the critical discourse surrounding the film. Whether the claim is that what is found in the final moments of the film is a "train of seeming non-subjects, decentered objects, events without significance" or that what is lost is any emotional or conceptual investment, a negative account of the film's articulation of void remains a common feature of the standard reading. 1 Nonetheless, the film's ending is powerfully affecting, and one way in which to offer a positive account of the scene's affective valence is to anchor the weight of the experience precisely in what is generated by the pervasive void, that is, boredom. Indeed, as Andrew Sarris's wellknown 1966 epithet "Antoniennui" indicates, boredom has long been associated with the director's work; thus, it remains curious that its rich experiential complexity has not only been repeatedly and reductively designated as a mere symptom of the modern alienation that Antonioni's cinema explicitly explores but, more broadly, has also been neglected by investigations of cinematic affect.
2 Yet, what sort of phenomenon is boredom? Is it to be understood as an emotion or the lack thereof? If it is a mood, is it triggered by a determinate set of external stimuli, or is it an internal state that "colors" our perception of the world? More specifically, how do we begin to understand the affective specifications of the boredom that we feel when watching a film, that is, what exactly are we feeling? One of the primary aims of this paper will be to address these questions. Towards that end, the first section will delineate how boredom as it operates in and through L'eclisse poses problems for cur-rent trends in the study of film spectatorship. Proposing an alternative to these approaches, the second section will turn to the phenomenological project of Martin Heidegger, whose account of mood draws attention to the ways in which boredom affords a unique affective disclosure of our relationship to time. The remaining sections will examine the representations and manifestations of boredom in L'eclisse alongside Heidegger-neither to argue that philosophy is to be applied to the film nor to claim that the film itself is "doing" Heideggerian philosophy but, rather, to demonstrate that each can be better understood in relation to the other and that, when taken together, both offer new ways to think about film affect and ontology.
Affect-Emotion-Mood
In response to what has been described as the history of film theory's problematic neglect of the body, a recent turn in film scholarship has sought to elucidate the philosophical and political implications of cinema's affective dimensions. However, such efforts have placed emphasis on the most readily identifiable and easily recognized emotions-excitement, disgust, sexual pleasure, sadness, fear, and so on-elicited by particular genres. For example, Linda Williams's important essay "Film Bodies: Gender, Genre, and Excess" expands upon Carol Clover's notion of "body genres," initially limited to pornography and horror, to include melodramatic excess in order to examine films that "privilege the sensational" and to investigate the kinds of affective significance they have for issues of gender representation and identification. 3 But it is clear that a film like L'eclisse, which intentionally mutes such conspicuous emotions, corresponds with neither the kind of body genre on which Clover or Williams place emphasis nor any of the other genres that Williams claims "portray and affect the sensational body," such as thrillers, musicals, or comedies-all of which evoke powerful sensations. 4 Similarly, the film can serve as a limit case for Jennifer Barker's recent attempt to offer a more ambitiously overarching description of embodied affects involved in and made possible through cinema. In her book The Tactile Eye, following Vivian Sobchack's influential application of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to film studies, Barker puts forth a theory of cinematic experience that seeks to ground its analysis on the co-constitutive, reversible relationship between bodies: both those of the viewing subjects and also that of the film and its capacity for embodied perception and expression. 5 By specifically locating the emergence of affect and meaning within the "liminal space" between film and viewer, towards a phenomenology of cinematic mood
Barker provides an explanation of cinematic empathy by exploring how both bodies engage one another in what she calls a "tenuous grasp." 6 According to Barker, the film's body, though operating with different types of comportment than that of a human (for example, editing, zoom, track, and so on rather than arms, legs, muscles, etc.), maintains enough similarities in perceptual and expressive modes that allow for an empathic, mimetic spectatorial experience (TE 77). Such an analogous relationship-one in which emotional sympathy's "feeling for" is seen as derived from muscular empathy's "feeling with"-between film and viewer "manifests itself in the muscular movements and comportments and gestures of each" (TE 92, 78). Hence, watching a film involves a form of affective empathy: to understand a film is to grasp it "in our muscles and tendons as much as in our minds" (TE 73).
L'eclisse, however, instead of adhering to Barker's "tenuous grasp," represents and executes what I will refer to as a profound refusal of empathy, identification, and affective comportment on various levels: the film's formal composition, its narrative representation of the characters' relationships to the world and to each other, and, as a result of the first two, the viewer's experience of the film. Though all three modes of refusal are simultaneously exemplified at multiple points throughout the film, I will begin with the opening sequence, where they are introduced and established.
The film's first twelve minutes employ a diverse set of formal techniques in order to frustrate our expectations of conventional film narratives and create a distance between film and viewer. These include but are not limited to the abrupt change in music during the title sequence; the disjunctive eyeline match shots; the mismatching of screen directions as the characters move towards or away from each other; the "ambiguous use of continuous and discontinuous space"; the "drab functionalism" of objects and furniture along with the high key and low contrast of the photography, all of which accord a "lack of naturalistic interest in the picture"; and-one that seems particularly challenging for Barker's notion of kinesthetic empathy-the way in which the choreography of actors' movements "into and out of deep screen, rather than movements across the screen surface . . . have the weakest possible kinetic effect upon the viewer." 7 The film opens onto a disorienting close-up shot of what seems to be a cluttered desk. If what is missing here to help position the viewer in relation to the diegetic space is an establishing shot, the narrative events which are unfolding in that space are equally obscured by the very fact that we are simply thrown into the end of what is alluded to as a long night of argumentation. Vittoria is ending her relationship with Riccardo (Francisco Rabal), yet no other contextual information is offered as to what led to her decision, except for her oft-repeated "I don't know." More jarring, however, is that after having established the significance of Riccardo's role in the first several minutes of the film and after having witnessed Riccardo's emotional waves of desperation, anger, and (a final false sense of) resolve, he is almost entirely removed from the plot thereafter. Hence, the unusual narrative presentation in which events are marked by an unsettling contingency demonstrates the way in which L'eclisse refuses our grasp of not only the film's possible organization and expression of meaning but also the characters' internal specifications, such as desire and intent, on which conventional forms of character identification depend.
These modes of refusal can be understood, according to András Bálint Kovács, as unfolding along a narrative trajectory towards the increasing designification of its characters. He claims that L'eclisse is a "drama of vanishing," by which he is referring not only to the gradual physical displacement and disappearance of the characters but also to the film's deepening sense of "emotional dissolution"-both of which culminate in their final and most explicit articulation in the film's ending. 8 This final montage is emptied out of any of the central characters and, instead, consists of a series of shots that represent the familiar objects and passersby that make up the background spaces where Vittoria and Piero, her second lover with whom her relationship is introduced and developed almost halfway into the film, spent much of their time together. Although the way in which these shots are abstracted from their function within plot development prompts us to seek out meanings and to try to take hold of, or grasp, the represented objects-which include the construction site of an unfinished building, the surrounding fence, the wooden barrel filled with water, the small stick floating in the barrel, the row of sprinklers, the intersection and its striped crosswalks, and so on-their random juxtaposition does not allow for a clear narrative interpretation, and the short duration of each shot inhibits us from taking up a position within that space. Yet, despite this void (or because of it), there is something deeply affecting in the experience of watching the final scene. If Kovács's interpretation of the film's narrative as progressing towards emotional dissolution is to be taken seriously, in what sense can we talk about affectivity without recourse to emotions?
In his recent study Moving Viewers, Carl Plantinga differentiates between affect and emotion, the former term broadly referring to "any bodily states" and the latter entailing a higher degree of cognitive processing that he identifies as "concern-based construals." 9 Moreover, he productively complicates this distinction with the category of mood. towards a phenomenology of cinematic mood According to Plantinga, while affects are automatic, noncognitive states elicited by motor mimicry and emotions are those affects that involve greater cognition, moods are "affective states that are said to lack a specific object and to be more lasting and diffuse than emotions proper" (MV 131). Following Greg M. Smith, Plantinga claims that "moods can prime emotions of a similar valence" (MV 132, 60-61). He allocates this priming function to what he calls "global, long-lasting emotions" in their interrelation to "local emotions" in order to demonstrate that spectator interest "stems not from a single emotion but from a variety of sources," including suspense, curiosity, anticipation, fear, surprise, disgust, desires, aversions, pleasures, and so on (MV 70). The argument, however, assumes that viewer interest, along with its variety of sources, is a given and overlooks the emotional disengagement central to the experience of watching a film that generates boredom.
Boredom, as an experiential phenomenon, has been largely overlooked in studies of film spectatorship and presents difficulties for both Plantinga's and Smith's theories of mood. In Film Structure and the Emotion System, Smith offers an account of mood that takes for granted a functional definition of emotion as assisting the viewer's ability to process information, form narrative hypotheses, or-if the film's stimulation of emotions is not bound to narrative-maintain particular predispositions through "a brief burst of emotion." 10 Yet, Antonioni's film demonstrates that maintaining a mood does not have to depend entirely upon "highly coordinated sets of emotion cues." 11 The final scene disrupts the linear process of narrative development and refuses retrospective valuation of the space's association with narrative memory by sustaining this disruption over a significant period of time not by way of emotional bursts but, rather, by way of their absence. This, however, should not amount to a cinematic experience that is merely characterized by what it lacks; instead, the film gestures toward the fullness of boredom, which cannot be accounted for by theories that understand mood as acting precisely to prevent it.
Thus far, I have examined the ways in which L'eclisse serves as a limit case to specific theories of cinematic spectatorship by demonstrating that the experience of boredom cannot be explained in terms that ascribe sole priority to either bodily registers or cognitive processes. Aside from the film's resistance to these formulations, to posit a more general field of noncognitive affects-whether understood as serving or exceeding reason-would raise the issue of how this separation of something like brute sensation from conceptual content amounts to a coherent picture of perceptual consciousness. Though the sort of phenomenological theory offered by Barker makes a strong case for the constitutive and holistic primacy of embodied perception, it does not account for the distinct affectivity afforded by the refusal of bodily comportment that occurs in boredom. In seeking out an alternative to these approaches, I will turn to Heidegger, who situates mood as being constitutively bound up with world disclosure and as an existential condition of the possibilities of "affects" and "emotions." 12 The following close reading of Heidegger is motivated by two key objectives. The first is to seek out a description of boredom as a cinematic mood that can be conceived of as a longer-lasting predisposition-a primarily temporal phenomenon-but one that, contra Smith, will not be dependent on the cuing of goal-oriented emotions and will, thereby, be amenable to the opening up of new affective possibilities that are not ancillary to the regulation of narrative information. The second will be to identify these affects and to delineate their relation to more phenomenologically basic structures of experience. If within the context of L'eclisse, boredom can be understood as resulting from the negation of signification and emotion while at the same time producing a different kind of affect, how can we come to understand the positive features of such an affectivity that arises from indifference?
Heidegger's Phenomenology of Boredom Mood occupies a central place in Heidegger's phenomenological project. The relevance of his approach can be underscored by recent psychological research that has demonstrated the difficulty of defining mood due to its propensity to obscure the distinction between the subjective and the objective. In their qualitative investigation, Marion Martin, Gaynor Sadlo, and Graham Stew examine a wide range of influential psychological studies that offer conflicting descriptions of not only boredom itself (for example, a state of low arousal due to an unstimulating environment, a state of high arousal due to the subject's restlessness and irritability, and so on) but also how it comes about (for example, low external stimulus, a subject's lack of interest, or a subject's dysfunctional personal traits and behavior). 13 The irresolvable tension in the surveyed research between attributing boredom to either an exterior, objective occurrence or an inner, subjective experience eventually leads the authors to the unsurprising conclusion that "the main consensus seems to be that boredom is a complex phenomenon." 14 This confirms one of Heidegger's basic claims that mood is neither an internal state that is prompted by external stimuli nor an inner phenomenon that is transferred onto the outer world. He writes, "A mood [Stimmung] assails towards a phenomenology of cinematic mood us. It comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside,' but arises out of being-in-the-world." 15 In Being and Time (1927), Heidegger maintains that mood is our "being-attuned" and is the always-already ontical manifestation of our "situatedness" (Befindlichkeit), which is one of the basic existentiales thatalong with understanding, discourse, and falling-together constitute the "there" of Dasein (BT 172-73), 16 a being for whom its very being is an issue (32). 17 Situatedness has three essential, disclosive characteristics: the first is that it discloses Dasein's thrownness, or "the facticity of its being delivered over" not only into its "there" but as the "there" itself; the second is that it discloses being-in-the-world as a whole "and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something"; and finally, it affectively discloses the world through Dasein's circumspective concern so that "what it encounters within-the-world can 'matter' to it" (174, 176-77). If situatedness is most ontically familiar as mood, the latter is not a derivative phenomenon to be ascertained as a "presence-at-hand." 18 Instead, the disclosive possibilities of situatedness only come about in and through mood: "In situatedness Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has" (174). As a result, we can never extricate ourselves from mood; its ontological disclosure is precognitive and prevolitional (175). Even in the face of what seems to be an utter absence, "the pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood . . . is far from nothing at all" (173).
In "What is Metaphysics?" his 1929 inaugural lecture at Freiburg, Heidegger identifies this deep lack as boredom and states, "Profound boredom, drifting here and there in the abysses of our existence like a muffling fog, removes all things and men and oneself along with it into a remarkable indifference. This boredom reveals beings as a whole." 19 That boredom "reveals beings as a whole" confirms its standing as a mood and simply reiterates Heidegger's discussion of the existential characteristics of situatedness in Being and Time. The important question to now turn to is: in what particular way-and with what particular affects-are beings revealed through such boredom?
In his 1929/30 winter semester course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger claims that boredom-for which the German Langeweile literally means "long-while" or "lengthening of the while"-makes explicit "a peculiar impressing of the power of that time to which we are bound." 20 Additionally, in accordance with his phenomenological project of dismantling the inner/outer dichotomy exemplified by Cartesian epistemology, this oppressive time is not an exterior entity that is imposed upon the inner consciousness of Dasein; rather, boredom is In further unpacking this connection between boredom and temporality, Heidegger distinguishes between three forms of boredom, each of which exhibits two structurally interwoven ways in which time temporalizes itself in its affective disclosure: "being held in limbo" and "being left empty." Heidegger's development of how these two structural moments operate differently in each of the forms of boredom follows a "direction in which boredom becomes more profound" (106, 133). As a result, his analysis progressively unfolds a more originary relationship that Dasein has not only with boredom but also with time itself, culminating in the third form, profound boredom, which Heidegger singles out as a "fundamental mood" (Grundstimmung).
The first form of boredom, characterized by a "becoming-bored-by," is illustrated by a mundane occurrence: waiting at a station for a train that is not scheduled to arrive for another four hours. Because his phenomenological project aims to explore the ways in which we move through boredom, Heidegger specifically focuses on our attempts at "passing the time" (Zeitvertreib) (91, 93). Therefore, in the example of waiting at a train station, the helpless repetition of checking the clock indicates a failure to pass the time and results in an increasing sense of becoming bored. If at the heart of passing the time is the desire to drive away the lengthening of the while, its breakdown in such situations demonstrates that the first form of boredom holds us in limbo through the dragging of time: "Becoming bored is a peculiar being affected in a paralyzing way by time as it drags" (98). Furthermore, in our tendency to constantly look at our watches, Heidegger points out that "we look away again just as quickly" and "toward nothing in particular," precisely because "nothing in particular offers itself to us" (99). Hence, in the being-left-empty of the first form of boredom, entities in our environment refuse to "take our comportment upon themselves" (103).
The example that Heidegger offers to illustrate "being-bored-with," the second form of boredom, is attending a dinner party in which "there is nothing at all to be found that might have been boring" but after which we retrospectively-upon resituating ourselves within the tasks that were suspended for the sake of taking up the invitation-realize the boredom that pervaded throughout the event (109). Because being-bored-with towards a phenomenology of cinematic mood emerges without a determinate specification of what is boring, passing the time is not isolatable to any given activity but, instead, permeates throughout "our entire comportment and behavior" during the event, which "itself is our passing the time" (112, 121). Thus, rather than through absence or refusal, we are left empty by an "obstructive casualness," in which we are taken by everything-abandoning ourselves to whatever is going on and, thereby, generating a self-forming emptiness (118-19).
Because time is set aside to be used up for a particular occasion, in being-bored-with we are bound to time not by way of its dragging but, rather, by way of its peculiar withdrawal-its standing: "This standing of time is a more originary holding in limbo, which is to say, oppressing" (122). In the "enduring of our during," time stands when "the 'now' is stretched . . . and held in this stretched standing in such a way that we are entirely there alongside and part of whatever is going on around us, i.e., in such a way that we are entirely present [ganz Gegenwart] for what is present" (124). Such standing of time prioritizes the "now" to the extent in which our "having-been and future . . . become modified in the peculiar manner of becoming enchained within the mere present" (125). As a result, time as ordered and measured into a succession of nows is reduced to presence-at-hand: calculated, organized, and distributed "as though Dasein were a business" (152).
What is affectively revealed in the first two forms of boredom is what Heidegger refers to in Being and Time as "now-time"-time in its datability and measurability. 22 In search of an alternative, Heidegger turns to a deeper form of boredom that discloses a more originary temporality, through which Dasein's ontological ground is constituted and from which now-time is derived.
If the first two forms of boredom demonstrate that the self that is oppressed by time and the self that is abandoned and left empty is "our own self," in profound boredom "we become an undifferentiated no one" (122, 135). Bound neither to a particular subject nor to a particular event, in the being-left-empty of profound boredom we "find ourselves in the midst of beings as a whole, i.e., in the whole of this indifference" (139). Yet, such total refusal that leaves Dasein empty with "no further possibility of acting" remains, for Heidegger, a telling refusal, which is "in itself a telling [Sagen], i.e., a making manifest" (140). What is specifically made manifest is not only a reference to the refused possibilities of Dasein but also the disclosure of those possibilities left unexploited (140-41). Moreover, this telling-or calling (Anrufen)-of such possibilities, to which the being-held-in-limbo of profound boredom refers, is "not some indeterminate pointing to arbitrary, changing possibilities of Dasein, but an utterly unambiguous pointing to whatever it is that makes possible, sustains, and guides all essential possibilities of Dasein" (143).
Additionally, in profound boredom, we no longer seek to stand time in its flow or pass the time in its dragging; furthermore-underscoring the inadequacy of associating the phenomenon with now-time-"looking at the clock here loses all meaning" (144). Rather, the intrinsic connection between the telling refusal of profound boredom and originary temporality lies in the unarticulated unity of the horizon of time, which becomes pronounced when "beings refuse themselves as a whole . . . in every respect, altogether in prospect and in retrospect" (143). If this unarticulated unity of the three ecstases of time-the simultaneous withdrawal of present, having-been, and future-entrances Dasein and serves as the temporal ground for the being-left-empty of profound boredom, its structural correlate in being-held-in-limbo is found in the temporality of originary possibility that ruptures this entrancement. This rupture is precisely what Heidegger refers to as the "moment of vision" (Augenblick): "The look of resolute disclosedness for action in the specific situation in which Dasein finds itself disposed in each case" (151). Therefore, what is revealed, both through the telling refusal of time as radically withdrawn into indifference and through the telling announcement that ruptures this entrancement, is time as that "which makes possible the possibility of Dasein" (148) and as that which "gives to be free . . . nothing less than the freedom of Dasein as such" (149). 23 The moments in L'eclisse previously discussed, which focused on the film's opening and final sequences and drew attention to the formal and narrative effectuations of profound refusal, can now be read alongside Heidegger's description of the first form of boredom. The characters are left empty in their inability to be taken, or captivated, by the entities in the diegetic world. To the aforementioned examples, we can add the helplessness Vittoria seems to undergo in Riccardo's apartment, something that grows evident in the way in which the many objects refuse her invested comportment. She mindlessly touches and rearranges things, restlessly paces around the apartment, and pulls back the blinds to make the outside world visible only to immediately crawl up on the sofa and shield herself away from it. Together with her repeated verbal and physical rejection of Riccardo, it is clear that Vittoria has already made up her mind to end the relationship and is desperately seeking ways to pass the time, which drags and oppresses itself on her as she yearns to leave.
Boredom in and through L'eclisse
Vittoria's relation to the objects surrounding her in the opening sequence of the film can serve as a possible parallel to the way in which towards a phenomenology of cinematic mood the viewer relates to the film during the final scene. The absence of the primary characters refuses us the sort of identification that conventionally allows for an intersubjective comportment that would aid in our grasp of and absorption in the various objects and passersby presented in the final montage. Hence, the being-left-empty and being-held-in-limbo of the first form of boredom marks our experience of the film as the objects in this space refuse our being-occupied with them. Our desire to pass the time through attempts to situate the shots within some narrative framework is thwarted by the abrupt cuts to yet more shots of seemingly random objects. Lasting several minutes and employing close to sixty shots, time draws attention to itself as it drags and forces itself upon us.
However, L'eclisse is also interspersed with vibrant scenes during which the characters seem wholly involved in whatever activity or relationship is at hand. The most striking example is that of the distinctive stock exchange sequences, where the unanswered question of what exactly the shareholders and traders are trying to grasp is perversely pronounced when the market crashes and refuses most everyone that which they elusively sought after. More important, however, is the way in which the people-with the exception of Vittoria, who wanders in to seek out her mother only to be eventually refused-are totally captivated by the market's ups and downs. It seems apparent that such dramatic moments should serve as counterexamples to the argument that the film represents and elicits boredom; however, this is precisely where Heidegger's account of the second form of boredom proves useful.
To be sure, the representation of the stock exchange is compelling: traders rushing back and forth and shouting over each other, while shareholders nervously watch from the sidelines. Time does not seem to drag. Yet, whereas in becoming-bored-by, time-unwelcomed and unexpected-interjects itself into our everyday and impedes upon the timely execution of our projected tasks, in being-bored-with, time is set aside for a particular occasion. In Heidegger's example, time is set aside to be "used up" at the dinner party. Similarly, the time that is allotted to the stock exchange's hours of operation is feverishly consumed, that is, time is calculated, ordered, and apportioned "as though Dasein were a business" (FCM 152). Indeed, time explicitly calls attention to itself only when the commotion is briefly suspended by a moment of aberrant silence dedicated to a recently deceased colleague. Even for this respectful gesture, however, time is set aside to be used up for a particular purpose. In both the usual clamor of activity and the sudden moment of silence, the being-held-in-limbo of the second form of boredom permeates as the now is stretched and as time is made to stand in its flow. Moreover, for Heidegger, the self-generated being-left-empty that emerges from being-bored-with is only retrospectively realized after the event has passed. Later in the film, Vittoria shares this key conversation with Piero about his work at the stock exchange:
You don't like to come to the exchange. Vittoria: I still can't figure out if it's an office, a market place, or a boxing ring. And maybe I don't need to. Piero:
You have to come often to understand it. If you get involved it becomes a passion. Vittoria: A passion for what, Piero? If Vittoria's last question intends to lay bare what Piero's passion aims to grasp, his silence is a profound one, powerfully exposing an indeterminate lack and affirming Vittoria's own oft-repeated "I don't know."
The second form of boredom is also represented in the film's penultimate scene, that is, the final encounter that Vittoria and Piero intimately share in the latter's office. There appears to be a genuine sense of happiness as they playfully chase each other around the room or affectionately lie together on the couch. Moreover, their promise to see each other at their usual meeting place later that evening seems earnest, and their final embrace conveys an almost overly dramatic sincerity. Similar to the stock exchange scenes, time does not drag here for the characters; but unlike the former, this scene is directly followed by a moment in which the affective realization of being-bored-with is made evident. As Vittoria slowly walks down the stairs and as Piero puts his office back in order and makes his way to his desk, something elusive yet visibly arresting comes over them. Vittoria pauses outside by the doorway. Piero leans back in his chair, ignoring the ringing telephones. What they are feeling or thinking about is not elucidated by the film, for the scene that follows is the final montage in which neither character is to be found. Nonetheless, it seems clear by this transition that the passion conveyed in the penultimate scene is only apparent, and their failure to meet at their usual street corner betrays an emptiness that has been looming, or self-forming, all along. 24 Hence, Piero and Vittoria's relationship-like the commotion at the stock exchange-is a passing-the-time that stands time in its flow in order to stretch the now. 25 At this point, one might say that these representations of the second form of boredom also provide the occasion for viewers to undergo similar experiences alongside the characters-to be completely absorbed with them in their engaged activity, while also sharing a sense of detachment and emptiness as the characters disconnect themselves from their everyday comportments. The problem, however, with placing such emphasis on character identification is that the film complicates viewer empathy by not only obscuring the characters' internal specifications but also towards a phenomenology of cinematic mood removing them entirely from the final scene. As an alternative, we might claim that one place in the film in which being-bored-with is possibly manifest in the viewer's experience is, again, the final montage, which recalls the abrupt moment of silence during the stock exchange scene when all activity was placed on hold in remembrance of a colleague who had passed away. If the standing of time in the final montage suspends the flow of narrative time in order to set the last several minutes aside to be used up in remembrance of the characters that are no longer there, then the cinematic experience becomes a succession of nows. Time is set aside within time to reflect on that which has passed on with time, that is, to appropriate the having-been into the making-present of now-time. Sorting out temporal experience in this way would result in a necessary demarcation between the time of viewing the film and the time of whatever activities we normally organize our lives around, thereby anticipating the self-forming emptiness that is generated by the very activity of watching the film, which itself turns out to be a mode of merely passing the time.
Yet, there's a risk of over-extending this claim beyond its reach, that is, to take self-forming emptiness as being generated by any and all films-a risk that would be built into any attempt at discerning particular instantiations of the second form of boredom. For this reason, the foregoing interpretation of how being-bored-with is made manifest in the viewer's experience involves a considerable degree of speculation, which is due primarily to the greater indeterminacy that corresponds with the deeper forms of boredom. Specifying exactly where the viewer is engaged or disconnected-where the viewer is taken by the narrative and where the viewer is left empty-is established on tentative grounds, especially if what is expected is a theory of spectatorship that depends on empathic identification with characters whose own intentions and desires remain, for the most part, indiscernible. Such problems are further exacerbated when considering the final form of boredom, which Heidegger not only claims is unrepresentable but also maintains that it gives rise to a radical indeterminacy that results in de-individuation. On the one hand, if the crucial role taken up by Heidegger's account of profound boredom is disregarded for the sake of an analysis restricted to the film's affective disclosure of now-time, then what is sacrificed is the positive affectivity of originary time that is revealed by the third form of boredom. On the other hand, it would seem that the task of taking a film as an object through which to investigate profound boredom runs the risk of methodical incoherence, and this would certainly be the case if L'eclisse was merely taken to be a representation of this phenomenon.
Instead, I will argue that L'eclisse offers itself as a site through which ontological issues central to Heidegger's analytic are cinematically, affectively worked out. In order to do so, however, what has been taken for granted thus far-namely, the assumption that the aesthetic allows for a being-in-the-world of a particular kind, in which various moods disclose not only how characters stand in relation to their world but also how the viewer stands in relation to both the diegetic and nondiegetic worlds-needs proper footing. Hence, in establishing the foundations of a possible Heideggerian ontology of cinematic world, I will show that the work of Stanley Cavell has taken an important first step.
Refusal and Revelation
In a telling passage from The World Viewed (1971), Cavell writes: "To satisfy the wish for the world's exhibition we must be willing to let the world as such appear. According to Heidegger this means that we must be willing for anxiety, to which alone the world as world, into which we are thrown, can manifest itself; and it is through that willingness that the possibility of one's own existence begins or ends." 26 By linking together anxiety with both the manifestation of "world as world" and the temporality of the "possibility of one's own existence," Cavell explicitly invokes Heidegger's account of mood in order to make an argument regarding the cinematic mode of letting "the world as such appear." Moreover, an important feature that distinguishes the fundamental moods, such as the anxiety of Being and Time and the profound boredom of the 1929/30 lecture course, from general moods-exemplified, for Heidegger, by fear-is the unsettling disclosure of Dasein's being-inthe-world as "not-being-at-home," an uncanniness (Unheimlickheit) in which everyday familiarity collapses. 27 Therefore, Cavell's ascription of a world-disclosive function to film that is explicitly resonant of Heidegger's formulation of fundamental moods is further illuminated by his claim that "the uncanny is normal experience of film" (WV 156).
Cavell describes this uncanniness as a defamiliarization of everyday spatiality and temporality, transpiring from an awakening to "our very distance and powerlessness over the world," which film in its mode of disclosure takes as "the condition of the world's natural appearance" (119). Hence, the uncanny characterizes how the world is cinematically given, precisely because of what Cavell refers to as the ontological fact of cinema: the film screen both "screens me from the world it holds . . . and it screens that world from me" (24) . 28 As a result of this bidirectional screening, our dislocation from and powerlessness over the towards a phenomenology of cinematic mood world are perceptually normalized and "mechanically assured" in film spectatorship. 29 Furthermore, Cavell situates the cinematic screen's mode of projecting, or presenting, the world as articulating a historically contingent condition of subjectivity: "[film's] displacement of the world confirms, even explains, our prior estrangement from it" (226). He writes, "At some point the unhinging of our consciousness from the world interposed our subjectivity between us and our presentness to the world. Then our subjectivity became what is present to us, individuality became isolation" (22) . Cavell continues by distinguishing two paths that have historically emerged with the aim of restoring our "conviction in reality." The first route, which he associates with romanticism, "was through the acknowledgment of that endless presence of self" and is exemplified by modernist painting's effort to "permit us presentness to ourselves, apart from which there is no hope for a world" (22) (23) . The second route restores our conviction in reality by overcoming subjectivity and removing the self altogether. For Cavell, this is epitomized by photography, which "maintains the presentness of the world by accepting our absence from it" (23) .
Thus, following along the trajectory established by the second route, film is the "moving image of skepticism" (188). At the same time, however, film also takes the skeptic's epistemological position regarding the inability to know the external world to its furthest limit: to the point of its solipsistic extremity at which it ruptures. 30 It is through film's capacity for both disclosing the uncanny-in its power to "let the world happen"-and ontologically leveling the human being with the "rest of nature," that it is able to reveal the world's mysteriousness (25, 37, 19) . Hence, although film offers a mode of perceptual engagement that renders "my life as my haunting of the world," the screened world's refusal of our grasp serves to offer itself anew: film wrests "the world from our possessions so that we may possess it again" (160, 22) .
If, according to Cavell, the inextricable connection between dispossession and repossession characterizes the distinct mode of what we might call a cinematic being-in-the-world, and if this complex interplay underlies Heidegger's structural formulation of refusal and revelation in fundamental moods, then in order to draw out the ways in which the third form of boredom operates in and through L'eclisse we must consider how refusal and revelation are at work in the film.
We can now closely examine a puzzling yet suggestive moment in the opening sequence where Vittoria, standing before a cluttered table, holds up an empty, open frame and moves objects around, within, and through it. She first pulls out an ashtray full of cigarette butts, before repositioning what seems to be a small modernist sculpture closer to the center of the frame. After a brief close-up of her face, the film cuts back to the objects on the table from a different position-this time, from the opposite side of the frame and from a further distance-so that we can see her hand reaching over the frame to feel the tip of an object. This is how Vittoria is introduced: through her careful interactions with an open screen, which allows her grasp to move in and through the spaces it frames. Shortly thereafter, Vittoria looks up at a painting on the wall: a closed screen that confronts her with a world to which she cannot reach out. If her first interaction with the open frame indicates a relationship with the world that Vittoria desires, then it is the second frame that immediately follows that ultimately defines what that relationship is actually like. This is reinforced by the next screen that she encounters in the apartment, the window. After aimlessly pacing about the room, Vittoria walks over to the drawn curtains and pulls them back to expose the world outside. Even so, she seems to remain restless and confined as she eventually falls to the couch in exasperation. What is significant is that while Vittoria stands before the window, it is unclear whether she is peering out onto the world or merely looking at her own conspicuous reflection. Recalling Cavell, we can maintain that the issue here is not deciding in favor of either one or the other but, rather, to say that she is looking out at the world through her reflection-an image which becomes increasingly pronounced as it reappears on the many reflective surfaces in Riccardo's apartment. Vittoria's "connection with reality," as mediated by a multiplicity of frames and screens, is thoroughly imbued with her "endless presence of self." The consequences of this are made evident throughout the film as she repeatedly fails to fully commit to relationships with the people and objects around her that pass in and out of her life-in and out of the film's frame. 31 Hence, Vittoria's engagement with the world is one that is characterized by what Cavell refers to as a punctuation of "our subjectivity between us and our presentness to the world"; her subjectivity is what is made present to her in her gradually intensifying isolation.
If Vittoria's subjectivity establishes one possible route that directs her search to regain a "conviction in reality," then following Cavell, we can add a second route: the very overcoming of that subjectivity. As we have seen, for Cavell, this overcoming is automatically secured by the mechanical fact of photography in that the photographic presentness of the world accepts "our absence from it." One significant moment in the film that depicts this altogether different relation to the screen is during Vittoria's visit to Marta's apartment, where she stands before a photograph of Mount Kilimanjaro. The film cuts to a very close, eyeline-match shot towards a phenomenology of cinematic mood of the photograph that is disproportionate to Vittoria's physical distance from it. With its own borders excluded from the shot, the picture of the snow-capped mountain, along with the trees that rest at its foothills, takes up the entire cinematic frame. What immediately follows is a shot over Marta's shoulder as she looks through a large picture book of African landscapes. In sharp contrast to Vittoria's encounter of the photograph of Mount Kilimanjaro, these borders are made conspicuous, and Marta interacts with the book by flipping through its pages and moving her hand over some of the pictures as she shares memories of her time spent in Africa. In this direct juxtaposition of two different perceptual engagements with images, what Cavell identifies as two distinct yet interrelated facts of cinematic perception emerge with alternating emphases. For Vittoria, her absorbed observation of the African landscape calls attention to her very absence from the photographed world. Not only are the borders of the picture frame off-screen but the frame's glass pane is also undetectable, and as a result, there is no reflection of her on its surface. There is a sense, here, that the picture is able to "let the world happen" as Vittoria's subjectivity is no longer interposed between her and the world. For Marta, what is highlighted is the pastness of the pictured world as she nostalgically recounts her experiences of living in Africa. Hence, as Cavell notes, the screen as barrier both "screens me from the world it holds" and also presents a world that "does not exist (now)" (WV 24) .
If the preceding examples show how the ontological issues at the heart of Cavell's Heideggerian formulation of cinematic experience are exhibited in L'eclisse, they also serve the role of preparing us for the final scene, which demonstrates how profound refusal is made manifest for the spectator. In Vittoria's encounter of the Mount Kilimanjaro photograph where she perceives a world from which she is absent, the viewer nonetheless knows-through both the narrative context and the eyeline-match shot that establishes her point-of-view-that she is located in that particular room looking at that particular picture. Conversely, the final scene completely removes Vittoria, heightening the absence of her subjectivity by presenting a world that is complete without her. Furthermore, although the picture of Mount Kilimanjaro offers a world from which Vittoria is absent, that world is nonetheless present to her as she observes it in Marta's apartment. However, in the final montage, not only is Vittoria absent, but whether the world is present to her is left uncertain. And yet, the world still remains present to us, its viewers; that is, the world is manifest by way of a perspective, but to whom it diegetically belongs remains ambiguous. As a result, this world of the final montage-which is engulfed in the indeterminacy that arises from the film's refusal of the viewer's attempts to cognitively, emotionally, or physically grasp the randomly juxtaposed objects and humans that are fixed within or that move through the particular location-presents itself to us as one from which we remain hidden. It is a world in which we can only haunt.
There are two significant features of such profound refusal that is at work in the final scene. First, the objects occupying the space are isolated from their previous use and are no longer confined to an operative role in the active comportment either of the main characters or of the film itself. In earlier scenes shot in and around the familiar EUR street corner many of these entities were impulsively taken up, for example, Vittoria and Piero splashing each other with the lawn sprinklers, Vittoria dropping a piece of wood into the barrel of water, the camera cutting to passersby as Vittoria looks around for Piero, etc. In the final montage, however, the same objects and, at times, the same passersby are presented but without the narrative context that they possessed before. Second, the pronounced absence of the central characters amounts to the loss of a subject with which the viewer could identify, resulting not in a decentering but, rather, in a deindividuation of subjectivity that is marked by a radical indifference. Without a narrative scheme that organizes the signification of space according to the logic of character identification, the objects and passersby that were formally relegated to the background have now been foregrounded to share the same framework-or the same absence-of meaning. Through the denarrativization of space and the deindividuation of subjectivity, background/foreground and subject/ object distinctions based on narrative conventions are undermined as all entities in the montage are presented alongside one another, bearing equal weight(lessness): as Cavell puts it, "Human beings are not ontologically favored over the rest of nature" (WV 37). Yet, it is precisely out of the void generated by this leveling effect that what emerges is a reference to the possibility of taking up such entities anew.
In recalling that profound boredom's telling announcement structurally corresponds to its telling refusal, what is revealed through the final scene's presentation of entities that refuse being taken up by our comportment-in the withdrawal of beings as a whole-is an indication of what Heidegger refers to as "possibilities left unexploited." Profound boredom's radical indifference, into which all modes of subjective identification have receded, is ruptured by a regenerated individuation, one that reveals that which makes possible the possibility of such subjectivity: "the Dasein in me" (FCM 143). How this regeneration of individuation in its inextricable relation to originary temporality functions in and through L'eclisse remains to be explored. towards a phenomenology of cinematic mood
The Affect of Finitude
The most striking aspect regarding the temporality in the film's final montage is that time itself is also engulfed by the radical indifference that immerses both subjects and objects alike. That is, the distinctions of time are left undetermined. The cut from the last moments of the penultimate scene-during which the camera pans from Vittoria's hesitation outside of Piero's office up to the trees that sway behind her-to the beginning of the montage sequence of objects and passersby in and around the EUR street corner remains temporally ambiguous. Though it is apparent that the recognizable space is where Vittoria and Piero have agreed to see each other, it is unclear whether the temporal setting is intended to be the evening on which the two were to meet. Could it be an evening that has been chronologically displaced into some point in the distant future (or even the past)? To take it further, is this an evening at all, or could it be an actual eclipse that is occurring? Heightening the void that permeates the scene, what is made explicit is the indeterminacy of-and an indifference to-time in the ordinary sense. Hence, following Heidegger's claim that in profound boredom the clock "loses all meaning," the temporality that functions here cannot be understood by reference to a linear succession of nows but, rather, by its withdrawal into an unarticulated unity-one that blurs the distinctions not only between present, past, and future but also between the temporal horizon of the film's diegesis and that of the film's viewer.
In the final scene, time's withdrawal into an unarticulated unity is itself articulated by its lengthening over several minutes-an articulation that, nonetheless, refuses to restore a determinate narrative or chronological scheme. However, this lengthening of time is to be distinguished from the kind of oppressive dragging that is affectively disclosed by the first form of boredom. According to Heidegger's account of profound boredom as the lengthening of the while, the "while" is not to be associated with "the time of the clock" but, instead, "the while that measures out that tarrying awhile [Verweilen] which is allotted to Dasein as such" (FCM 152). What is meant, here, by the "tarrying awhile" is elaborated in Being and Time, where Heidegger formulates Dasein's temporality, which is "ecstatically stretched along" between "birth and death," as grounding the simultaneous disclosure of the world as Dasein's being-in-the-world and also the disclosure of the time that is "allotted to Dasein" (BT 425, 463). Therefore, the "while" that is uncovered in profound boredom is the originary time that temporalizes the existential movement of Dasein, and it is this "while" that not only "becomes long" in profound boredom but also "includes in itself a peculiar indication of its shortness"-an indication of Dasein as a "short while" (FCM 152-53). 32 Hence, the time that is revealed in profound boredom is that of Dasein's finitude. However, this shortness of the time allotted to Dasein is not to be conflated with what we normally take to be the end of a human life. For Heidegger, "the absolute impossibility of Dasein" is not an altogether cessation of living-something like demise-but, instead, indicates a breakdown of the totality of possibilities for a particular way in which Dasein has taken a stand on its own being. 33 It is in this absolute impossibility that the "uncanniness announces itself," and it is through being-towards-death as "ownmost possibility" that Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-being is discovered-to become what it is not yet (see BT 287, 296, 307). 34 Whereas what is tellingly refused in profound boredom's lengthening of the unarticulated unity of time that entrances Dasein is time as it is ordinarily put to use in our everyday, what is tellingly announced is the originary temporality that first makes now-time possible and that includes within itself an indication of Dasein's finitude: its being-towardsdeath. Here, time undergoes a powerful transformation as it participates in-while allowing for-the structural oscillation between refusal and revelation. If revelation, as the moment of vision, arises through rupturing the entrancement of the temporal horizon, then what is disclosed is the possibility of appropriating anew not only beings as a whole but also both time itself and, as a result, Dasein's potentiality-for-being. 35 Here, I would like to offer two suggestions as to how particular aspects of the final scene could serve as ways through which being impelled towards the moment of vision emerges as a possibility. The first can be associated with the physical location in and around which the final montage takes place. In addition to the ending, many of the film's scenes are set in the EUR, a site that exhibits the process of historical change and reconstruction. An urban complex that was initiated through fascist implementation, the EUR, during the time of the film's production, was well underway in its redevelopment into a business and residential center. Hence, the EUR-and, in particular, the building that is undergoing construction on the street corner, which Vittoria and Piero have assigned as their meeting place-is a site that historically embodies the existential structure of refusal and revelation. Like the viewer who is confronted with a montage of seemingly random objects and passersby, which are stripped of their backgrounded narrative function and presented as entities that both refuse our grasp and indicate the possibility of their being discovered anew, the EUR spatially reflects the temporal juncture at which political identity is destabilized and through which reappropriation is mobilized. Hence, in the final scene, historical time and individual time become intertwined-both cinematically presented as finite in profound boredom's lengthening of the while. towards a phenomenology of cinematic mood
The second possibility is bound up with what has already been described as the interplay between telling refusal and telling announcement, that is, the withdrawal of beings as a whole and the announcement of unexploited possibilities. If this interaction is contingent upon the structure of refusal and revelation intrinsic to originary temporality, then the unarticulated unity of time, into which beings as a whole withdraw, already promises its own rupture. Perhaps one point at which this is made explicit is the abrupt announcement of the film's ending "FINE" in bold letters as the final shot lingers on a street lamp before the film fades to black. With the film's end, the viewer is thrown back into the world of her own time, and, corresponding to Heidegger's three forms of boredom, there are three possible affective disclosures of time. In the cinematic effectuations of the first two forms of boredom, the distinction between the time of the film's world and the time of the viewer's world is made conspicuous-both rendered as now-time, where one successive ordering of temporality is sharply juxtaposed with, and eventually preferred over, another. However, if the film's final scene engenders an aesthetic transcription of the unarticulated unity of time by entrancing the viewer's temporal horizon, then the film's ending could be understood as announcing not a sudden ending of one experience of time and the beginning of-or return to-another but, rather, a reference to the deeper oscillation between entrancement and rupture, refusal and revelation. Here, the time of the film folds the viewer's temporality into profound boredom's lengthening of the unarticulated unity of time, and within this withdrawal and lengthening is an indication of time's "shortness," or finitude: the impermanence of the film's diegesis, of the cinematic apparatus, and of the viewer herself. If so, the film's abrupt ending could serve to rupture the entranced temporality that is at work in and through the final montage, reminding us of the essential possibility of originary time's transformation, which makes possible discovering anew both the manifestation of the cinematic world and the givenness of our own.
Conclusion
The present study was prompted by an initial line of inquiry into the ways in which Antonioni's L'eclisse functions as a limit case for current trends in film scholarship-both those affect-oriented theories of spectatorship that do not account for the cinematic experience of void and those interpretations of the film that rest solely on negative conceptions of that void. By turning to two generally overlooked areas in film studies, that is, the affectivity of boredom and Heidegger's phenomenological project, and demonstrating how together they elucidate the unusual kind of engagement that Antonioni's film demands, the aim of this analysis has been to draw out the rich possibilities that indifference and refusal afford to investigations of film mood and temporality. Additionally, by way of delineating the central place that Heidegger's formulation of mood occupies in Cavell's film ontology, I have attempted to gesture towards a nonrepresentationalist account of film experience, for which boredom not only marks the "feeling of time" in its particular instantiations in L'eclisse but also affectively discloses deeper forms of temporality that can be extended to the study of a wider range of cinematic phenomena.
Because of its specific concern with boredom, the present study has been primarily focused on the relationship between affect and time. However, it is important to note that, for Heidegger, an adequate discussion of affect must make reference to other basic structures of being.
To be more precise, situatedness is only one among a fundamental set of equiprimordial existentiales-also including projection, falling, and discourse-that are distinct yet coconstitutively intertwined. Thus, although it has been my hope to show that Heidegger's work provides important ways to think about affective temporality, further research is anticipated in the following two areas: how a phenomenological elucidation of the inextricability of mood from understanding, intersubjectivity, and language might contribute to a more holistic theory of affect; and how cinema can serve to enrich and complicate our sense of time-not only that time which we are bound to but also that time which we ourselves are. 
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